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ON STOPPING AND RESTARTING THE RACE: A
RESPONSE TO MALLOY'S LAW AND
ECONOMICS
David Ray Papket
I. INTRODUCTION
As a former resident of Indianapolis, Professor Robin Paul Mal-
loy will recall that every spring this conventional city of good bur-
ghers gets a little wacky. People begin to drive more aggressively,
dress like high-tone auto mechanics, and speak reverently of "the
race." On Memorial Day weekend, several hundred thousand people
descend on an oval in the adjacent town of "Speedway" and in a
swirling mass watch thirty-three motorized vehicles attempt to nego-
tiate five-hundred miles at untoward speeds. The major source of
symbolic sanity in this spectacle is the chief starter, an official perched
on a platform over the track who waves flags of different colors to
indicate changes in the state of the race.
Were he to return to Indianapolis and take up the role of chief
starter, Malloy would display strengths and weaknesses. Most admi-
rable would be his waving of the yellow flag, the signifier for caution.
Less appealing would be his work with the green flag. Despite great
animation in his work, Malloy would restart the race after an accident
in only a cautious and partial way. Put more prosaically, Malloy in
the preceding article is insightful and forceful in his critique of Rich-
ard Posner's "economic analysis of law," but Malloy's self-con-
sciously ambitious alternative model is merely one genre in a more
diversified discourse.
II. MALLOY'S YELLOW FLAG
While unique and especially important, Malloy's critique of Pos-
ner's "economic analysis of law" hardly initiated the scholarly attack
on Posner's work. Almost as soon as Posner's Economic Analysis of
t Professor of Law and American Studies, Indiana University School of Law -
Indianapolis. A.B. Harvard College, 1969; J.D. Yale Law School, 1973; Ph.D. (Ameri-
can Studies) University of Michigan, 1984.
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Law appeared in its first edition in 1973,1 lengthy essays aggressively
criticizing the book appeared in major journals.2 Perhaps the most
read was the late Arthur Allen Leff's "Economic Analysis of Law:
Some Realism About Nominalism. ' '3 A nasty writer when he put his
mind to it, Left characterized Posner's relentless application of his
theory to all areas of law as "the literary equivalent of dropping a
hundred metals successively into the same acid to see what happens." '4
In Leff's opinion, Posner had deceptively substituted definitions for
normative and empirical positions.
In the years since the publication of Leff's biting article, Posner
has continued to write and unsympathetic scholars have continued to
criticize his work.5 Not even a federal judgeship has slowed Posner's
truly remarkable scholarly productivity, and indeed, he has even ven-
tured from his law and economics base to jurisprudence6 and to the
promising field of law and literature.7 Posner critics have much to
discuss, and a new literature has begun to emerge dealing with Pos-
ner's opinions on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.8 If Posner
struts about like the star of contemporary legal academics, the critics
seem sometimes like so many paparazzi pursuing the great one in
hopes of capturing him in an unflattering moment.
Malloy, at least, is no silly shutterbug, and his work is distinctive
in the body of Posner criticism because Malloy himself has a right-of-
center political alignment and is enamored with a law and economics
framework. When Malloy in his early work so vigorously invoked the
1. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973).
2. Two particularly thoughtful review essays concerning Posner's text are Krier,
Book Review, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1664 (1973) and Hermann, Book Review, 1974 WASH.
U.L.Q. 354.
3. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L.
REV. 451 (1974).
4. Id. at 452.
5. The critical response to Posner's work is immense, but especially important arti-
cles include Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3
(1975); Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227
(1980); and West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral
and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REv. 384 (1985).
6. R. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990).
7. R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988).
My thoughts on the preceding are expressed in Papke, Problems with an Uninvited Guest:
Richard A. Posner and the Law and Literature Movement, 69 B.U.L. REv. 1067 (1989).
8. Shapiro, Richard Posner's Praxis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1077 (1989); Wilson, Con-
straints of Power: The Constitutional Opinions of Judges Scalia, Bork, Posner, Easterbrook
and Winter, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1171 (1986).
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economist Milton Friedman, 9 Malloy's comparative disregard of Pos-
ner implied rejection. Malloy then made clear that he thought Pos-
ner's work was flawed. 10 When Malloy more recently compared
Posner unfavorably to Adam Smith in the Kansas Law Review,1'
Posner felt obliged to respond,12 and the two have even debated face-
to-face at Valparaiso University.1a Malloy's newly published text14
promises to rival Posner's Economic Analysis of Law as a standard
law and economics textbook, and articles have begun to appear sug-
gesting the Malloy-Posner debate is central to the entire law and eco-
nomics enterprise.15
Malloy's critique of Posner is both theoretical and metaphorical.
The essence of the theoretical dispute is Posner's endorsement of neo-
classical economics and of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as the paramount
values for society. This endorsement is so offensive to Malloy's own
preference for individual liberty as a paramount value for society that
Malloy angrily banishes Posner clear to the communitarian end of the
political spectrum. There, starring Bruce Ackerman, the nefarious
personification of liberalism, and assorted spokesmen for critical legal
studies in the eye, poor Posner receives his just deserts. What the
assorted progressives think of their new comrade, meanwhile, is an-
other matter. Ackerman's scholarship, after all, has been previously
subjected to blistering attack by Posner,16 and Posner has also charac-
9. Malloy & Hoeflich, The Shattered Dream of American Housing Policy - The
Need for Reform, 26 B.C.L. REv. 655 (1985); Malloy, The Economics of Rent Control -
A Texas Perspective, 17 TEx. TECH L. REV. 797 (1986).
10. Malloy, Equating Human Rights and Property Rights - The Need for Moral
Judgment in an Economic Analysis of Law and Social Policy, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 163 (1986).
11. Malloy, Invisible Hand or Sleight of Hand? Adam Smith, Richard Posner and
the Philosophy of Law and Economics, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 209 (1988).
12. Posner, The Ethics of Wealth Maximization: Reply to Malloy, 36 U. KAN. L.
REV. 261 (1988). For other examples of Posner's sharp replies in writing to his scholarly
critics, see Posner, The Ethical Significance of Free Choice: A Reply to Professor West, 99
HARv. L. REV. 1431 (1986) and Posner, On Theory and Practice: Reply to Richard Pos-
ner's Praxis, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1077 (1989).
13. Malloy and Posner, Debate.: Is Law and Economics Moral?, 24 VAL. U.L. REV.
147 (1990).
14. R. MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE-
ORY AND PRACTICE (1990).
15. Braun, Alternative Rhythms in Law and Economics: The Posner-Malloy Dialec-
tic, 15 LEGAL STUD. F. (1991).
16. In a review article concerning the works of Bruce Ackerman and Ronald Dwor-
kin, Posner bemoaned the tendency of lawyers who write philosophical texts "to think
that they can appropriate traditional concepts, change them beyond recognition, conjure
with them rather than build a sustained and coherent argument, yet still be engaged in a
1991]
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terized the writing of a leading critical legal studies scholar as
"marred by stridency and turgidity, as well as by exaggeration and a
patronizing tone." 17
Putting squabbles over who has to roost with whom on the polit-
ical spectrum aside, Malloy's metaphor of "two mirrors" 8 superbly
captures the character and appeal of Posner's approach and gives
pause to anyone inclined to use Posner's work as the guiding light in
law and economics teaching and scholarship. Posner's work, Malloy
suggests, involves holding the law - one mirror - before a second
mirror - neoclassical economics. The presence of two mirrors reas-
sures those who can no longer pretend that law is autonomous, but
the model is also more traditional than it first appears. Reasoning
remains homologous to traditional legal reasoning, and with reference
to neoclassical economics one may still obtain "correct" answers.
Neoclassical economics in itself is a simplistic and partisan variety of
economic thought, more grounded in Posner's conservatism than in
anything scientific. Posner's reductiveness and bias, when exposed by
Malloy's metaphor, hardly inspires confidence or commitment.
One hopes Malloy's efforts will once and for all limit Posner's
appeal in law and economics circles and in the legal academy as a
whole. Posner deserves praise for a large body of provocative, well
written work, and he is an especially interesting example of the "con-
ceptualism" Grant Gilmore warned us was always tempting to Amer-
icans trained in the law. 19 One might even beneficially teach and
study Posner's work as a reaction to the anxious uncertainty of
postmodern intellectual life. However, Posner's theory represents
professionally respectable activity. . . ." Posner, Lawyers as Philosophers: Ackerman and
Others, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 231, 249 (1981).
17. Posner, A Manifesto for Legal Renegades, Chicago Daily L. Bull., Feb. 1, 1988,
at 2, col. 4 (review of M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987)).
18. Malloy, Toward A New Discourse of Law and Economics, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV.
27, 39 (1991).
19. In a 1970 lecture which was later formally published, Gilmore said:
We have witnessed the dismantling of the formal system of classical theorists.
We have gone through our romantic agony - an experience peculiarly unset-
tling to people intellectually trained and conditioned as lawyers are. It may be
that, in this centennial year, some new Langdell is already waiting in the wings
of summon us back to the paths of righteousness, discipline, order, and well-
articulated theory.
G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 103 (1974). Reflecting in 1977 on his early
words, Gilmore suggested that Posner's work exemplified a "new conceptualism" in legal
scholarship. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 146 (1977).
[Vol. 42:209
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only a narrowly partisan variety of economic thought, and his preten-
sions to scientific objectivity are disingenuous. Stationed on his plat-
form high above the racing oval, Malloy serves us well by waving the
yellow caution flag. Posnerian "economic analysis of law" has been
an accident, and all drivers must slow down to avoid exceedingly dan-
gerous track conditions.
III. MALLOY'S GREEN FLAG
Were Malloy to follow his occasional inclination to cast law and
economics as a creative interdisciplinary discourse and leave it at that,
one could fully commend him. However, he is not content to critique
Posner and simply call for something more fluid and open-ended. In
the preceding article he constructs an elaborate model of his own, one
which, like Posner's "economic analysis of law," is unabashedly de-
scriptive and normative. Malloy's model demonstrates both his learn-
edness and sensitivity to contemporary intellectual rhythms, but the
model is ultimately unsatisfactory as a paradigm for the entire inter-
disciplinary study of law and economics.
One can credit Malloy with recognizing all shaped patterns of
thought are aligned. Thinking primarily of literary text, the British
critic Raymond Williams has written:
Writing, like other practices, is in an important sense always
aligned: that is to say, that it variously expresses, explicitly or im-
plicitly, specifically selected experience from a specific point of
view. There is of course room for argument about the precise na-
ture of such a "point of view". It does not, for example, have to be
detachable from a work, as in the older notion of a "message". It
does not have to be specifically political, or even social in the nar-
rowest sense. It does not, finally, have to be seen as in principle
separable from any specific composition .... Alignment in this
sense is not more than a recognition of specific men in specific (in
Marxist terms class) relations to specific situations and exper-
iences. Of course such a recognition is crucial, against the claims
to "objectivity", "neutrality", "simple fidelity to the truth", which
we must recognize as the ratifying formulas of those who offer
their own senses and procedures as universal.20
Reflecting instead on legal and economic thought and eschewing
any class analysis, Malloy is nevertheless in essential agreement. His
20. R. WILLIAMS, MARXISM AND LITERATURE 199 (1977).
1991]
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"legal economic discourse" diagrammatically acknowledges that both
law and economics are aligned in and of themselves and with refer-
ence to the dominant ideology of a given community.21 Furthermore,
the alignment of law or economics or of the dominant ideology gener-
ally is never fixed. Various alignments and ideologies compete, and
especially in periods of significant socioeconomic restructuring radical
realignments and ideological shifts can occur.22 Apparently no fan of
an Althusserian epistemological break,23 Malloy posits instead a type
of grand evolution through linear time, and he also manifests a plural-
istic ethos eloquently calling for fair and open access to his discourse.
How could one quarrel with this admirably contingent, fluid and
open discursive model? For starters, note how surprisingly conven-
tional it is. "Legal economic discourse" will be a conversation con-
cerned with the allocation of power and resources, and we will
converse, Malloy says repeatedly, with reference to "individual, com-
munity and state." Are we also free to converse about race, class and
gender? What about approaches to world order either eschewing or
moving beyond the tired, war-causing nation state? Others could pre-
sumably add new concepts and perspectives to the discourse, but
shorn of its semiotics sideburns, the visage of Malloy's model looks a
lot like old-fashioned political economy, 24 albeit with a special empha-
sis on things legal.
The conventionality of Malloy's primary discursive concerns re-
lates to his political preferences. Political economy, after all, was not
only a corpus of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century work dealing
with the accumulation and distribution of economic surplus but also a
political call for an unhindered civil society independent of the state.25
21. Malloy, supra note 18, at 45-53.
22. Id.
23. L. ALTHUSSER, FOR MARX 13 (1977). Malloy also fails to acknowledge or en-
dorse the assertion of the non-Marxist historian of science Thomas Kuhn that once in a
great while continua of thought are so significantly ruptured as to constitute scientific
revolutions. See generally T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
111-36 (1962).
24. The phrase "political economy" has acquired various connotations over the
years, including but not limited to the general study of the interaction of political
processes and market relations. More traditionally understood, "political economy" re-
fers to certain writings and theories of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus,
and James and J.S. Mill. Malloy writes in this tradition.
25. I. BRADLEY & M. HOWARD, CLASSICAL AND MARXIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY
(1982).
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Malloy himself is an avowed follower of Adam Smith.26 In his insuffi-
ciently integrated discussion of communitarianism and individualism
in the preceding article, Malloy detectably tilts the discussion toward
the varieties of conservatism and libertarianism which he either calls
his own or for the most part respects. Conversely, his token articula-
tion of progressive legal ideologies is seriously flawed. Communitari-
anism, for example, is cast as statist. Yet Karl Marx himself
projected a withering away of the state, and the contemporary trans-
formation of communist states has renewed communitarian theo-
rizing regarding alternatives to the state. 27 Malloy characterizes the
contemporary critical legal studies movement as standing for Marxist
determinism, but the movement has articulated legal indeterminacy
as its most central thesis.
Given the politics which he wears so proudly on his sleeve, Mal-
loy perhaps cannot be expected to master the large family of law-
related progressive ideologies. He also can be granted the familiar
propagandistic donnee of mischaracterizing the opposition. But re-
member that Malloy is not portraying himself as a propagandist but
rather as the articulator of a model. Revelations of political imbal-
ance limit our confidence in the model. When Malloy acknowledges
that gaining power over the discourse can lead to control of the legal
environment, he contributes further to our leeriness.
Beyond its conventional focus and political bias, Malloy's model
suffers from a culture-bound perspective. In the warm glow of a war
won, one perhaps need not apologize for western and, in particular,
Anglo-American assumptions, but if Malloy is to provide a truly open
law and economics model, he should struggle to move beyond his own
deep cultural assumptions. His definition of key terms, selection of
representative figures, and modified political spectrum all reveal a cul-
tural monocentrism. Surely Malloy may enter the terms, heroes and
schematic renderings of his culture into the discursive conversation,
but his model should be more receptive to cultural diversity, particu-
larly if it is to live up to Malloy's expansive hopes.
Contemplate in this regard something as fundamental as his con-
ception of legal doctrine. Malloy writes of legal justifications and
rules and gravitates quickly to images of judges using precedents to
26. In addition to Malloy, supra note 18, note in particular Malloy's use of Smith's
theory to critique Posner's theory in Malloy, supra note 11.
27. Surin, Marxism(s) and "The Withering Away of the State", 27 SOCIAL TExT 35
(1991).
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decide cases. However, if one ventured from this common law world
across either the British Channel or the Rio Grande, one would en-
counter instead highly detailed legislative codes and judicial function-
aries unable to invoke stare decisis or to make law. Venturing further
afield, one would find codes in Asian cultures serving as mere veneers
for tradition, faith and morality; and in Third World countries diverse
combinations of customary law and western legal droppings. In the
words of the comparative law scholar John Henry Merryman:
The legal tradition is a part of the culture, a very old, deeply
rooted, firmly held part. The relations between legal ideals and
similarly profound social, economic and political attitudes is [sic]
extremely close and extremely complex. The law both draws
meaning from and supplies meaning to the rest of the culture, and
is inseparable from it.28
Not only the laws themselves but also the fundamental understand-
ings of law vary from culture to culture. Malloy should realize that as
he proffers his model he, like all model builders, projects his cultural
norms as much as he frames and directs a consideration of them.
In sum, Malloy's "legal economic discourse" is more of a genre
within the law and economics discourse than it is the discourse it-
self.29 As genre, Malloy's construct is commendable. Genre, after all,
is a powerful explanatory and critical tool,30 and, as noted earlier,
Posner's genre has been unduly prominent. Yet still other genres are
possible and welcome. Having taken up a crucially important posi-
tion on race day, Malloy should be prepared to restart the race even
more boldly. If he looks out on the entire track, he might imagine all
that the race could truly be.
28. J.H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 145 (1985).
29. For tentative commentaries on genre and discourse, see Harrell and Linkugel,
On Rhetorial Genre: An Organizing Perspective, in METHODS OF RHETORICAL CRITI-
CISM 404-19 (B. Brock & R.L. Scott eds. 1980) and Snedaker, Storytelling in Opening
Statements: Framing the Argumentation of the Trial, in NARRATIVE AND THE LEGAL
DISCOURSE: A READER IN STORYTELLING AND THE LAW 133-35 (D.R. Papke ed.
1991).
30. Standard commentaries on the importance of genre include A. FOWLER, KINDS
OF LITERATURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF GENRES AND MODES (1982)
and A. ROSMARIN, THE POWER OF GENRE (1985). An isolated but excellent application
of genre theory to a legal topic is Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2
YALE J. L. & HUMANITIES 201 (1990).
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